INTRODUCTION
In an important paper, Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton and Roberta Romano highlight the role of common stock held by corporate board members (director ownership) in the current corporate governance debate. 1 They find a significant positive relation between director ownership and firm performance, and director ownership and effective monitoring of managers. This finding leads to two interesting questions:
• Should outside directors have financial stakes (via stock ownership) in the performance of the firms that they monitor and counsel?
• What determines director ownership levels?
In the aftermath of the scandals of 2001-2002 and increased regulations imposed by Sarbanes
Oxley, many firms have turned to additional firm-level governance mechanisms designed to improve incentive alignment. 2 Some of these policies have been the introduction of director and executive equity ownership requirements. These requirements provide a useful setting for examining both the determinants of director ownership and the relationship between their ownership levels and firm performance.
This paper begins with an examination of the determinants of ownership requirements, as well as actual equity holdings of outside directors. We find that ownership requirements are more common in large firms. We also find that these policies impact actual holdings in 2005 but 1 Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano,The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, Columbia Law Review, 108:8, 1803 Review, 108:8, -1882 Review, 108:8, (2008 . 2 These requirements can be a useful supplement to equity-based compensation schemes. Eli Ofek and David Yermack find that after an initial level of holdings is met, managers sell whenever they get stock. If directors' desired level of holdings differs from levels that are optimal from the viewpoint of shareholders of that company, ownership policies can help curb director stock sales and keep incentives aligned. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, Journal of Finance 55(3), 1367-1384 (2000) .
not during 2003. The results for 2005 may be due to a trend of increased enforcement, and perhaps greater board sensitivity to these requirements during the post-Sarbanes Oxley period.
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In the second part of the analysis, we document the relationship between director holdings and future performance. We find that director holdings predict year-ahead performance (measured as return on assets, ROA), for both the 2003 and 2005 cross-sectional samples. The challenge in interpreting this empirical result is analogous to Harold Demsetz's critique of the managerial ownership and company performance literature. 4 Demsetz notes that most of corporate governance literature focuses on the manager-shareholder agency costs of diffused share-ownership. He argues that since we observe many successful public companies with diffused share-ownership, clearly there must be offsetting benefits, for example, better riskbearing. He further argues that if observed ownership levels reflect equilibrium outcomes then observed correlations between managerial ownership levels and corporate performance are spurious.
We address the Demsetz critique in the third stage of the analysis where we use handcollected data on director ownership policies at all S&P500 firms for the years 2003 and 2005 to explicitly control for mandated ownership levels. Under the maintained hypothesis that ownership requirements reflect optimal ownership levels, they provide a useful identification tool in the examination of ownership-performance relationships. This allows us to identify the impact of "out of equilibrium" holdings. We find that mandatory holdings are not related to future performance; this result is consistent with the above maintained hypothesis -that 3 Ran Duchin, John Matsusaka, and Oguzhan Ozbas, When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming 2010. These authors also document that companies did not immediately respond to the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley regarding board composition. Over a period of years companies became more compliant. 4 Harold Demsetz, The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm, Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 375-390 (1983 
I. BOARD OWNERSHIP
The corporate form has consistently been an effective method of business organization.
Great industrial economies have grown and prospered where the corporate legal structure has been prevalent. This organizational form, however, is not without flaw. The multiple problems arising out of the fundamental agency nature of the corporate relationship have continually hindered its complete economic effectiveness. Where ownership and management are structurally separated, how does one assure effective operational efficiencies? Traditionally, the solution lay in the establishment of a powerful monitoring intermediary -the board of directors, whose primary responsibility was management oversight and control for the benefit of the residual equity owners. To assure an effective agency, traditionally, the board was chosen by and comprised generally of the business's largest shareholders. Substantial share ownership acted to align board and shareholder interests to create the best incentive for effective oversight.
Additionally, legal fiduciary duties evolved to prevent director self dealing, through the medium of the duty of loyalty, and to discourage lax monitoring, through the duty of care. No direct compensation for board service was permitted. By the early 1930's, however, in the largest public corporations, the board was no longer essentially the dominion of the company's most substantial shareholders. However, as the shareholders' legal fiduciaries, the outside directors were still expected to expend independent time and effort in their roles, and, consequently, it began to be recognized that they must now be compensated directly for their activities. The primary responsibility of the corporate board of directors is to engage, monitor, and, when necessary, replace company management. The central criticism of many modern public company boards has been their failure to engage in the kind of active management oversight that results in more effective corporate performance. It has been suggested that substantial equity ownership by the outside directors creates a personal incentive to actively monitor. An integral part of the monitoring process is the replacement of the CEO when circumstances warrant. An active, non-management obligated board will presumably make the necessary change sooner 9 rather than later, as a poorly performing management team creates more harm to the overall enterprise the longer it is in place. On the other hand, a management dominated board, because of its loyalty to the company executives, will take much longer to replace a poor performing management team because of strong loyalty ties. Consequently, it may be argued that companies where the CEO is replaced promptly in times of poor performance may have more active and effective monitoring boards than those companies where ineffective CEO remain in office for longer periods of time. Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton find that when directors own a greater dollar amount of stock, they were more likely to replace the CEO of a company performing poorly.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION

A. Mandatory and Voluntary Ownership
We use hand-collected data on director ownership policies for the years 2003 and 2005. 7 This information is obtained from proxy statements for the years 2003-2006 8 for all firms in the S&P 500 as of December 31 2005. Most of the proxy statements are dated within three months after calendar year end. The analysis assumes that the policy as of the proxy statement date reflects guidelines in place during the past year unless the proxy states otherwise (e.g., policy is new and introduced at a particular date, in which case the policy as of the year t-1 proxy is used).
Policies are included when they are in place for more than half of the calendar year prior to the date of the proxy statement. We exclude firms for which proxy statements are unavailable The ownership guidelines are typically found in the "Corporate Governance" or "Board of Directors" subsections of the proxy statements. The search terms used to identify holdings policies are: "stock ownership, ownership guidelines and ownership." Whenever guidelines
were not found by the simple document search, the documents were reviewed by hand. One important caveat is that disclosure of ownership policies is not required; however, there is little reason for us to believe that firms have strong incentives to hide them from their investors. The fact that so many firms voluntarily disclose suggests that the information is believed to be valuable to shareholders. Moreover, unless the links among holdings, requirements and performance vary systematically with firms' decisions to report their policies, any omissions would not impact the estimated coefficients.
Policies mandating director ownership take several forms such as: retainer multiples (most common); dollar requirements; share requirements; multiples of shares or cash awarded as compensation; multiples of exercised options. Examples of these policies can be found in Appendix A. The examples are based on first ten firms (based on the S&P 500 list, sorted alphabetically) for which policies were identified in the 2005 sample period. There are some companies for which ownership is "encouraged" (but not required). Those firms are considered not to have a policy. In the cases in which policies vary by director tenure, we take the policy for a first year director to be the relevant policy.
All ownership requirements are transformed to a common measure: Requirement, equal to the dollar value of required holdings, divided by the annual cash retainer. 9 We focus on this ratio based on the assumption that retainers are set such that it is worth the directors' time to 9 Share requirements are converted into dollars using the closing stock price at the end of year t.
participate on the board. In this case, the cash retainer is a useful benchmark. One might be concerned that retainers (and ownership requirements) are small relative to directors' wealth;
however, recent findings reveal that directors respond to very small monetary incentives.
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To our knowledge, these data on mandatory director holdings are unique. John Core and David Larcker also examine mandatory holdings policies, but there are two important differences between their data and ours. 11 First, they collect data on target ownership levels for executives.
Our focus is on required holdings by outside directors. Second, our sample is based on all the S&P 500 companies, whereas Core and Larcker examine firms that announced the introduction of policies and changes to their policies. This allows them to identify changes in ownership policies, but not levels of ownership implied by these policies. An important concern is the possibility that firms adopt policies based on "one-size-fitsall" guidelines from corporate governance consulting firms. However, this does not appear to be the case. The standard deviation of the ownership requirement is about twice the mean in 2003 and 1.25 times the mean in 2005. We do, however, observe increased policy adoption and overall increases in required holdings during our sample period. Table 2 provides additional descriptive statistics on firms with ownership requirement policies and also reveal substantial variation in the types of policies adopted.
B. Firm Characteristics
Summary statistics on firm characteristics and performance measures are also presented in 1155-77 (1985) . 16 Note that there are two potential forces at work: It may be more difficult to monitor a large firm because of its size and the amount of information that must be processed, therefore increasing the value of providing directors with equity incentives. On the other hand, empirically, large firms have been associated with variables related to low information asymmetry (analyst coverage, equity market spreads, etc), which suggests that more information about these firms is produced. If director ownership requirements are put in place to improve poor governance, we would expect to observe more ownership requirements in firms with otherwise poor governance.
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Results are in Table 3 . The most important determinants of having a policy in place are firm size and the frequency of antitakeover provisions. In 2005, low industry growth opportunities and poor prior equity returns in the industry are associated with the introduction of policies. This result highlights the importance of including industry controls in the analysis. We focus on policies in S&P500 firms; however, the industry controls allow us to capture potential industry- The analysis presented in Table 4 is similar to those in Table 3 , except that we present OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the level of required holdings relative to the annual retainer. All independent variables are identical to the Table 3 Having documented the determinants of holdings policies, we now turn to determinants of actual holdings. The main goals in this part of the analysis are: (1) to investigate whether determinants of directors' actual ownership differs from the variables that explain mandatory ownership levels and (2) to test whether mandatory ownership levels explain actual holdings. If policies are important, we would expect a significant role for ownership requirements in directors' decisions to hold stock. Table 5 presents results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of actual holdings to retainer. The independent variables are identical to those in Table 4 , except that Requirement (required holdings) has been added as an explanatory variable.
The most important observation from G-Index) . This is in contrast to the finding that requirements are more likely in firms with higher frequency of antitakeover provisions. This suggests that when directors choose their own ownership levels, they prefer to own stock in firms that have lower frequency of antitakeover provisions.
In the next section, we analyze the relationship between voluntary and mandatory ownership and firm performance.
IV. HOLDINGS AND PERFORMANCE
We begin with an analysis of the relationship between actual holdings and performance. Table 6 . Interestingly, we also find that the dollar value of the retainer has an independent positive role in future performance. This is consistent with recent findings that payments as small as $1000 meeting fees provide incentives for directors. 24 Not surprisingly, the results in Table 6 also document a positive link between firm and industry ROA.
Although the Table 6 results suggest a positive link between director holdings and performance, the Demsetz critique that observed correlations between managerial ownership levels and corporate performance are spurious if ownership reflects equilibrium outcomes is valid. 25 To address this critique, we use required holdings to identify optimal ownership levels.
We can then test for the relationship between actual holdings and performance since we observe "out of equilibrium" holdings (actual holdings net of firm-level requirements). 26 Results of this analysis are in 62, 559-571, (2001) . 26 One potential concern is that firms' ownership requirements reflect a "minimum" level, and that this differs from optimal levels. However, we find a large number of cases in which boards are given several years to acquire required positions (see the examples in the Appendix). It is unclear why boards would allow members several years to acquire "minimum holdings". It is more likely that time is allowed to accumulate the optimal position. 27 In robustness analysis, we use the existence of an ownership policy for CEOs in order to control for potential unobservables that might cause a firm to adopt a director policy. Results are similar.
Based on the results in Table 7, all The ownership requirements that we observe are significantly related to variables that indicate greater monitoring difficulty (such as size) as well as otherwise weak corporate governance. These requirements impact actual holdings by outside directors.
We find that, even after controlling for required holdings, actual holdings impact future performance (return on assets, ROA). A one standard deviation increase in director holdings increases next period ROA by about one to three percent.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics of ownership requirements for the S&P500 firms during the years 2003 and 2005. Median Director Holdings are the median dollar value holdings of all of a given firm's outside directors during year t, as reported in ExecuComp. The Cash Retainer is the annual cash retainer, as reported in ExecuComp. Director (Executive) Ownership Requirements Dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a director (executive) ownership requirement in its proxy statement. Ownership Requirement is dollar ownership requirement, divided by the annual cash retainer. Firm performance and characteristics are: ROA, defined as earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets; Capex/Assets, defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets; Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Q, defined as (equity market capitalization, plus book value of assets, minus book value of common equity), divided by book value of assets; and Standard Dev Returns, the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Corporate governance measures are the G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) ) and CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives. This table presents LOGIT regression estimates in which the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm has a director ownership requirement (in its proxy statement). Explanatory variables are: Q, defined as (equity market capitalization, plus book value of assets, minus book value of common equity), divided by book value of assets; Industry Q, defined as the median value of Q in the industry (2-digit SIC code); Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Standard Dev Returns, the standard deviation of daily stock returns; Lag Returns, equity returns during year t-1; Industry Lag Returns, median equity returns based on all firms in the industry (2-digit SIC code) during year t-1; Return Volatility, the squared standard deviation of daily stock returns; CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives; and G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) This table presents OLS results estimates in which the dependent variable the ratio of required equity holdings to annual cash retainer. Explanatory variables are: Q, defined as (equity market capitalization, plus book value of assets, minus book value of common equity), divided by book value of assets; Industry Q, defined as the median value of Q in the industry (2-digit SIC code); Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Standard Dev Returns, the standard deviation of daily stock returns; Lag Returns, equity returns during year t-1; Industry Lag Returns, median equity returns based on all firms in the industry (2-digit SIC code) during year t-1; Return Volatility, the squared standard deviation of daily stock returns; CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives; and G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Holdings, the ratio of the median dollar value of equity holdings by all outside directors to the annual cash retainer. Explanatory variables are: Q, defined as (equity market capitalization, plus book value of assets, minus book value of common equity), divided by book value of assets; Industry Q, defined as the median value of Q in the industry (2-digit SIC code); Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Standard Dev Returns, the standard deviation of daily stock returns; Lag Returns, equity returns during year t-1; Industry Lag Returns, median equity returns based on all firms in the industry (2-digit SIC code) during year t-1; Return Volatility, the squared standard deviation of daily stock returns; CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives; and G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) This table presents results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is year-ahead return on assets (ROA, defined as earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets). Explanatory variables are: Median Director Holdings/Retainer, the ratio of director equity holdings (median holdings of all outside directors) to the annual cash retainer; Industry ROA, defined as the median earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets for all COMPUSTAT firms in the industry (2-digit SIC code); Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Retainer, the annual cash retainer, as reported in ExecuComp;; CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives; and G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) This table presents results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is year-ahead return on assets (ROA, defined as earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets). Explanatory variables are: Median Director Holdings/Retainer, the ratio of the median dollar value of equity holdings by all outside directors to the annual cash retainer; Industry ROA, defined as the median earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets for all COMPUSTAT firms in the industry (2-digit SIC code); Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Retainer, the annual cash retainer, as reported in ExecuComp; Requirement, the ratio of required equity holdings to annual cash retainer; CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives; and G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) This table presents results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is year-ahead return on assets (ROA, defined as earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets). Explanatory variables are: Median Director Holdings, the (log) dollar value holdings of all outside directors; Industry ROA, defined as the median earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes, divided by total assets for all COMPUSTAT firms in the industry (2-digit SIC code); Sales, defined as total revenue in millions of dollars; Retainer, the annual cash retainer, as reported in ExecuComp;; CEO Pay Slice, defined as the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the firm's top 5 executives; and G-Index (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
